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most difficult to overcome is in the field of terrorist threat analysis. When
estimating the threat associated with naturally occurring events,
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events. Threat associated with accidents applies many operations
research tools to gauge future failure-rates (Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis being perhaps the most widely known). However, estimating the
probability of an individual's or group's attacking a specific (or even a
generic) target is an element of risk analysis in which art and intuition
are applied far more regularly than is science.
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Introduction
To the extent one can use the term, the "traditional" method to estimate 
terrorist threat is to decompose threat into two components,1 "intent" and 
"capability," estimate the two variables independently, and then combine 
them (usually, but far from always, multiplicatively) to generate a non-
dimensional threat score.2 This threat score may take the form of an ordi-
nal ranking (some variant on high, medium, or low), or it may take on a 
cardinal value (where, for example, a value of six represents a threat 
which is twice as likely to occur as a threat represented by a three). Which 
form the score takes depends on the nature of the problem which the ana-
lyst is to address.
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While the specific terminology varies from tool to tool, "capability" ranges 
on a scale which begins with a variant on the theme "the group does not 
possess the resources, training, or experience" to execute the attack. 
"Capability" ratings steadily increase until they end with "the group has 
executed a very similar attack before."
"Intent" ratings follow a similar course. They begin with a variant of the 
theme that the group in question posses "no known desire" to execute 
such an attack and end with the assessment that the group has developed 
and is implementing "a feasible plan" to conduct that attack.
For both "intent" and "capability" ratings, analysts reference a scoring 
matrix which provides several descriptions and corresponding scores. 
They match their understanding of the threat to the closest "intent" and 
"capability" description the matrix offers. They then pull out the scores 
linked to the descriptions which they previously choose. Finally, they 
combine those scores in a predetermined function to generate a single 
threat number.3 That combination mechanism is either a look-up table or 
a simple function (additive or multiplicative) and does not require analyt-
ical interpretation to produce.
Issues with Current Approaches
There are five major issues associated with this "intent" and "capability" 
framework, and these issues are both interrelated in nature and com-
pounding in effect. They all, directly or indirectly, impact the inherent 
uncertainty of threat estimates, uncertainty which arises from both a pau-
city of specific data regarding "intent" and the environmental reality that 
"intent" can change rapidly.
Implied Precision
When applying ordinal scales, precision is not an issue because the differ-
ence between a "low" rating and a "very low" rating is not a relevant con-
cern. Unfortunately, quantitative assessments—the types which provide 
analysts the ability to combine factors—require a great degree of differen-
tiability in scores, and that requirement demands cardinal scales. Addi-
tionally, the use of these scales creates a perception that the threat 
assessment is both defensible and reproducible, characteristics which are 
at odds with the subjective and uncertain data which serve as input.
In cases where analysts examine scenarios which are relatively similar 
(e.g., Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) attacks on air-
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ports versus IED attacks on aircraft), this differentiability requirement is 
not a significant burden. The challenge comes to the fore when comparing 
the threats associated with very different scenarios. When the nature of 
either the attack method or the target changes significantly from scenario 
to scenario (e.g., VBIED attacks on bridges versus biological attacks on 
bus stations), "intent" and "capability" scores may vary by several orders 
of magnitude—and it is then that the difference between a "low" and a 
"very low" score matters greatly.
Relative Nature of Estimates
The second issue, related to the first, is that terrorist threat assessments 
produce relative likelihood estimates, not absolute ones. When compar-
ing similar scenarios, this is not materially important; analysts can gener-
ate reliable estimates using techniques such as benchmarking and 
reasoning-by-analogy. However, this characteristic becomes more and 
more important as scenarios become increasingly dissimilar.
Analysts can make judgments regarding the relative likelihood of two 
similar scenarios—they simply point to areas of divergence and make rea-
soned comparisons between the two. However, when there are very few 
points of similarity, it is no longer possible to make that comparison, and 
the technique—along with the analysis it supports—loses its value.
Human Factors
What makes the situation so frustrating is that it is exceptionally chal-
lenging to develop cardinal scales of "intent" and "capability," especially—
but not exclusively—at the very low end of the scale. Because quantitative 
formulas combine several variables multiplicatively, the impact of a 
change of X basis points increases as the score decreases (ΔX/4, for exam-
ple, is twenty times greater than ΔX/80). Compounding that challenge is 
the behavioral reality that people do not have the capacity to make mate-
rial distinctions between frequency estimates when the difference 
between one estimate and another is small (e.g., a 4% probability and a 
5% probability are both "low" even though one is 25 percent greater than 
the other). In that light, it is potentially problematic to believe quantita-
tive analyses in cases where analysts have to decide whether a low proba-
bility event—an event which has never happened—has a 1 in 100, 1 in 
1,000, or 1 in 10,000 chance of occurring.
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Correlated Variables
The fourth issue is that it is difficult to develop an approach which com-
bines "intent" and "capability" scores in a consistent, defensible fashion. 
Federal analysts have been using variants of the "intent" and "capability" 
framework for decades, and it was a particularly useful model when 
decomposing threat on a large-scale, multi-year, nation-state level (e.g., 
the Soviet Union's development of a manned bomber program). However, 
for terrorism threat assessment purposes, applying that same framework 
can present its own issues.
Because "intent" and "capability" are not independent variables (an orga-
nization which does not possess chemical weapons is not going to develop 
tactical plans to use them), a formula for combining the two variables has 
to be non-linear (the threat associated with an "intent" score of 0.5 and a 
"capability" score of 0.5 cannot automatically be equivalent to a threat 
with an "intent" score of 0.25 and a "capability" score of 1.0). While it is 
clear that there is a correlation between the two variables, the nature of 
the relationship between the two variables is not well understood. Indeed, 
it may change on a scenario-by-scenario basis.
Inter-Judge Consistency
The final issue is that multiple analysts, all sorting through complex, 
incomplete data, and converting that information into a single score, do 
not consistently agree about what that score should be. Part of the chal-
lenge is that neither "intent" nor "capability" data is sufficiently clear-cut 
as to allow for a mechanistic conversion from textual information to a 
point score. Part of that challenge is that analysts have individual biases 
upon which they rely to weigh the value of the information they use to 
make their judgments. And part of that challenge is analysts do not always 
feel compelled to follow the ranking guidance they receive.
These challenges combine to reduce the degree to which scores are 
repeatable across analysts. While there are techniques to improve cross-
analyst consistency (such as beginning the process by ranking a represen-
tative set of scenarios as a group), these techniques only reduce the con-
sistency problem; they do not eliminate it.
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A Different Approach
To partially compensate for these issues, analysts may consider using a 
threat-scoring system based on the resources necessary to carry out the 
attack. Such a system assumes that organizations do not pursue acquiring 
the capability to conduct attacks which they have no intent of executing.
To apply this system, the analyst first determines the level of resources 
terrorists need. There are six options from which to choose, ranging from 
those of a nation-state to those of a single, law-abiding resident.
Once the analyst decides which table to apply, he or she determines which 
description of activity/reporting is most similar to the threat being exam-
ined. The analyst then uses the three scores corresponding to that 
description either as the points of a triangular distribution (for a Monte 
Carlo simulation) or as the limits of a range in which they independently 
choose a point estimate of threat—using the value in bold font as a 
default.4 
Example Using Proposed Approach
Consider the case where an analyst is examining the likelihood of al-
Qaida using a nuclear weapon against the United States. The analyst 
would first decide, based on the North Korean experience, that executing 
such an attack would require both a decade and resources of a nation-
state. That decision would drive the analyst to use Table II. After review-
ing current intelligence, the analyst would decide that, within Table II, the 
word picture which comes closest to describing the current intelligence is, 
"There are no indications of any nation-state transferring technical 
knowledge, material, or devices to the enemy." Accordingly, the analyst 
would use the points .00–.001–.003 as the low, medium, and high points 
for a Monte Carlo simulation.
Example Using Current Approach
Consider the same case, but change the analytic framework to the "intent" 
times "capability" approach, where both "intent" and "capability" are 
measured on ten-point scales. That same analyst would agree with Presi-
dent Obama's statement on April 12, 2010, when he said, "We know that 
organizations like al-Qaida are in the process of trying to secure nuclear 
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, and would have no com-
punction at using them." Accordingly, the analyst would assign an 
"intent" score no lower than a "1"—meaning that al-Qaida's level of intent 
is as least aspirational. The analyst's next step would be to examine "capa-
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bility." For that category, the analyst would again review current intelli-
gence and would decide that al-Qaida does not have, but is trying to 
acquire, components for a nuclear device. Accordingly, the analyst would 
assign a "capability" score no lower than a "1."
Multiplying the two terms generates a threat score of 1 (out of 100)—
implying that the likelihood of al-Qaida using a nuclear weapon against 
the United States is at least 1% as great as that of al-Qaida attempting an 
attack via any other vector (such as Improvised Explosive Device [IED]). 
It is clear that this conclusion materially overstates the likelihood of al-
Qaida attempting to attack the United States with a nuclear weapon, 
given:
•   existing safeguards on fissile material;
•   al-Qaida's limited resource base;
•   their familiarity with other attack vectors; and
•   the relative ease with which they could execute an IED attack.
Limitations
The scales used are relative. While these tables provide analysts with a 
tool which allows them to compare across materially different threat sce-
narios, the scores are not directly comparable with the frequency esti-
mates associated with natural hazards. For example, it is reasonable to 
assign Umar Abdulmutallab's attempt to bomb Northwest Flight 253 to 
the ".60–.75–1.0" range in Table V, where "Delivery to the target site 
requires specialized knowledge or equipment and there are credible indi-
cations that the enemy possesses that knowledge or equipment." How-
ever, that range (0.60–1.0) is far too high to be an annual probability 
since the previous attempt, Richard Reid's plot to bomb American Air-
lines Flight 63 occurred eight years prior. The time lag between those two 
events indicates that the suggested probabilities may be six to ten times 
too high to be absolute values.
The validity of low-end scores remains questionable. While the range of 
the scale used (0.001–1.0) provides for finer low-end gradation than does 
a 1 to 10 scale, there is little to suggest that the scores for very low proba-
bility threats (e.g., improvised nuclear devices) are within even an order-
of-magnitude of reality.
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This approach assumes that analysts will be aware of terrorists' efforts to 
develop innovative ways to combine existing skills and knowledge to cre-
ate new attack vectors. Terrorists have repeatedly demonstrated their 
ability to innovate; and there is every reason to assume that they will con-
tinue to do so. They will creatively combine resources to circumvent exist-
ing security measures, and, when they do, it is quite likely that their 
adaptability will surprise analysts and security professionals alike.
Finally, this approach does not account for serendipity. While terrorists 
take a deliberate approach to planning attacks, random chance plays a 
part in target selection as well (e.g., a terrorist cell with a member who is a 
bridge engineer is more likely to attack a bridge than is a cell without 
one). Similarly, random chance is likely to play a role in capability devel-
opment. If a terrorist cell happens to recruit both a chemical engineer and 
an HVAC repairman, that cell is far more likely to attempt to develop a 
chemical weapon than would otherwise be the case.
Conclusion
Terrorism risk analysis is a field in its infancy, and it faces many chal-
lenges, not least among them being the development of useful and accu-
rate quantitative threat assessment methodologies. Practitioners have 
identified a need for a substitute for the "intent" and "capability" model of 
threat analysis, and this monograph serves to shine a light on one possible 
alternative.
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Table I: Ranking Estimated Capability
Score A B C D E F
Resour
ces 
needed 
to exe-
cute 
attack
Requires 
a decade 
and 
resources 
of a 
nation-
state to 
execute
Requires 
years of 
multiple 
people 
with 
graduate 
degrees 
in techni-
cal sci-
ences, 
and 
resources 
of For-
tune 
1,000-
like com-
pany to 
execute
Requires 
multiple 
people 
with 
graduate 
degrees 
in techni-
cal sci-
ences, 
and luck, 
to exe-
cute
Requires 
special-
ized 
knowl-
edge of 
technical 
or engi-
neering 
pro-
cesses to 
execute
Requires 
the 
acquisi-
tion of 
illegal/
con-
trolled 
products 
to exe-
cute
Requires 
legally 
pur-
chased 
products 
and 
readily 
available 
manufac-
turing 
instruc-
tions to 
execute
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Table II: Nation-State
Table III: Fortune 1,000 Company
Score .00 – .001 – 
.003
.01 - .05 – 
.20
.05 – .20 – 
.30
.40 – .60 – 
.85
Requires a 
decade and 
the 
resources 
of a nation-
state to exe-
cute
There are no 
indications of 
any nation-
state trans-
ferring tech-
nical 
knowledge, 
material, or 
devices to the 
enemy
There is 
unconfirmed 
reporting 
that a nation-
state has 
transferred 
knowledge to 
the enemy or 
there are 
indications 
that the 
enemy can 
acquire 
device due to 
inadequate 
security at a 
storage site
There is 
unconfirmed 
reporting 
that a nation-
state has 
transferred 
material to 
the enemy
There is con-
firmed 
reporting 
that a nation-
state has 
transferred 
material to 
the enemy or 
there are 
indications 
that a nation-
state has lost 
control of a 
man-porta-
ble device
Score .001 – .005 – 
.01
.05 – .15 – .50 .35 – .40 – .85
Requires years 
of multiple 
people with 
graduate 
degrees in 
technical sci-
ences, and the 
resources of 
Fortune 1,000-
like company 
to execute
There are no 
indications of 
any organization 
transferring 
technical knowl-
edge, material, or 
devices to the 
enemy
There is uncon-
firmed reporting 
that a company 
has transferred 
manufacturing 
knowledge to the 
enemy or there 
are indications 
that the enemy 
can acquire 
material due to 
inadequate secu-
rity at a storage 
site
There is con-
firmed reporting 
that a company 
has transferred 
manufacturing 
knowledge to the 
enemy
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Table IV: Multiple Technically-Trained People
Table V: Specialized Knowledge
Score .001 – .01 – 
.02
.01 – .05 – 
.10
.30 – .50 – 
.80
.70 – .80 – 
1.0
Requires 
years of 
multiple 
people with 
graduate 
degrees in 
technical 
sciences, 
and luck, to 
execute
There are no 
indications 
that the 
enemy has 
begun a 
research pro-
gram
There are 
multiple 
reports that 
the enemy 
has begun a 
research pro-
gram
There are 
multiple 
reports that 
the enemy 
has begun 
testing a 
delivery 
device
There are 
multiple 
reports that 
the enemy 
has com-
pleted an 
effective dis-
tribution sys-
tem
Score .05 – .20 – .30 .40 – .50 – .80 .60 – .75 – 1.0
Requires spe-
cialized 
knowledge of 
technical or 
engineering 
processes to 
execute
Delivery to the 
target site 
requires special-
ized knowledge 
or equipment 
and there are no 
credible indica-
tions that the 
enemy possesses 
that knowledge 
or equipment
Delivery to the 
target site 
requires special-
ized knowledge 
or equipment 
and purchasing 
or renting that 
knowledge or 
equipment is a 
commercially 
viable option
Delivery to the 
target site 
requires special-
ized knowledge 
or equipment 
and there are 
credible indica-
tions that the 
enemy possesses 
that knowledge 
or equipment
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Table VI: Illegal Products
Table VII: Legal Products
References
1   Threat is the likelihood of an attack being attempted by an adversary or the likeli-
hood that a hazard will manifest itself within a given time-frame.
2   In this model, capability is the ability of an adversary to attack with a particular 
attack method, while intent is the desire or design to conduct a type of attack or to 
attack a type of target.
3   These scores are either cardinal or ordinal in nature.
4   The look-up tables are at the end of this monologue.
Score .10 – .15 – 
.40
.20 – .40 
– .50
.20 – .40 
– .60
.50 – .60 
– .70
.50 – .60 
– 1.0
Requires 
the 
acquisi-
tion of 
illegal/
con-
trolled 
products 
to exe-
cute
The enemy 
would have 
to steal a 
product to 
acquire it 
in the U.S. 
and there 
are no 
indica-
tions this 
has hap-
pened
The enemy 
would have 
to steal a 
product to 
acquire it 
in U.S. 
and there 
are indica-
tions this 
has hap-
pened
The enemy 
could pur-
chase the 
product in 
the U.S. 
and there 
are no 
indica-
tions this 
has hap-
pened
The enemy 
could pur-
chase the 
product in 
the U.S. 
and there 
are indica-
tions this 
has hap-
pened
There are 
indica-
tions that 
the enemy 
has 
acquired 
the prod-
uct out-
side of the 
U.S.
Score .70 – .80 – .90 .80 – 1.0
Requires legally 
purchased prod-
ucts and readily 
available manufac-
turing instructions 
to execute
The target is easily 
accessible and the pur-
chase of a quantity of 
equipment necessary to 
develop a device may 
raise suspicion
The target is easily 
accessible and the pur-
chase of a quantity of 
equipment necessary to 
develop a device would 
not raise suspicion
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